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Abstract 
In the extensively studied equal division puzzle, one finds very large shares of equal bequests and 
unequal  inter-vivos  transfers  given  to  adult  children.  However,  such  puzzle  is  less  evident  in 
Europe as we find a higher prevalence of parents giving equal inter-vivos transfers. We argue that 
altruistic parents are also concerned with norms of equal division. Thus, parents do not fully offset 
child income inequality. The parents start to give larger transfers to poorer children if the child 
income inequality becomes unbearable from the parent‟s view. We find econometric evidence for 
this behaviour using microeconomic data of 12 European countries from the two waves of the 
Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). 
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1. Introduction 
Considerable  research  has  been  devoted  to  study  the  financial  transfers  from  parents  to  adult 
children as this enables to infer the motive for transferring family resources, which in turn allows to 
asses the effectiveness of a redistribution policy
1. These transfers are made in the form of  inter-
vivos transfers and bequests. Many studies that use data from the US show that inter-vivos transfers 
are  given  unequally  to  children  while  bequests  are  mainly  equally  shared.  Dunn  and  Phillips 
(1997), Wilhem (1996), McGarry (1999) and Norton & Van Houtven (2006) find that, in general, 
more than 80% of the families intend to give equal inheritances. By contrast, only 17.7% of the 
mothers in Light and McGarry (2004) give equal transfers to their adult children. Using the Health 
and Retirement Study dataset (HRS), McGarry (1999) finds that 6.4% of the households give equal 
financial transfers to their adult and non co-resident children; this figure is 7% in McGarry & 
Schoeni (1995). With the same dataset for the years 1992-2002, we can infer from the results of 
Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2009) that about 9% of households give equal transfers to their children, 
although these figures include children of any age and residing or not in the same home with the 
parents. The equal division of bequests is not predicted by altruistic and exchange models, which 
has lead to the so called equal division puzzle. The signalling model of Bernheim and Severinov 
(2003) explains this puzzle in a setting of altruistic parents by considering that inter-vivos transfers 
are  private  information  while  bequests  are  public,  and  that  bequests  signal  parental  affection. 
Lundholm  and  Ohlsson  (2000)  also  assume  the  private/public  information  dimension  of  the 
transfers but they consider that parents care about a post mortem reputation. This reputation is 
damaged if parents depart from a social norm that stipulates equal sharing among siblings. The 
existence of this equal division norm is only assumed in Lundholm and Ohlsson (2000) but the 
model of Bernheim and Severinov (2003) explains its existence and strength. This model leads to 
equilibria where equal division of bequests and unequal distribution of financial gifts are feasible. 
                                                       
1 In Becker (1974), Barro (1974) and Tomes (1981) the parent transfers money to her adult children due to her altruism, 
so that a non-distortionary intergenerational redistribution policy would be fully neutralized by the parent. In contrast, 
Bernheim et al (1985) and Cox (1987) consider strategic motives to transfer, under which the parent gives bequests or 
inter-vivos transfers to instil some services (help, visits, etc.) from her children. In this approach, the redistribution 
policies can still be effective. Pestieau (2003), Laferrere and Wolff (2006), Arrondel and Masson (2006) and Cox and 
Fafchamps (2008) offer reviews of the literature on inter-vivos transfers and bequests.   3 
In terms of Laitner (1997), a social norm of equal sharing of transfers may enhance efficiency by 
cutting rent seeking behaviour from siblings who compete for larger parental resources and help 
preserve peace in the family. For Wilhelm (1996), parents distribute equally their estates because 
they  would  suffer  of  psychic  costs  (jealousy  and  family  conflict)  if  they  deviate  from  equal 
division.  Similarly,  Cremer  and  Pestieau  (1996)  cite  sociological  theory  to  argue  that  the 
unaccomplished equal division of estates may lead to dispute among children, which parents fear 
the most, much more than not achieving an equal distribution of income. Moreover, in behavioural 
economic experiments, equal division is a norm that commonly emerges (see Camerer and Fehr, 
2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 2002) from the interaction among individuals. In a model of social image, 
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) argue in favour of a 50-50 norm for a variety of environments 
(including dictator games that can be extended to parental decisions about division of transfers) 
when individuals are fair-minded and people like to be perceived as fair. 
  Most of the theories and empirical research try to explain patterns of family transfers with US 
data. As suggested in Pestieau (2003), there is a lack of studies with a focus on Europe due to data 
limitations. The institutional variation of European countries may make it possible to test different 
theoretical predictions in a more convincing way. Fortunately, the launch of the Survey of Health, 
Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) in 2004 may help to overcome this limitation and shed 
some light on how European parents behave with regard to family transfers. A quick inspection of 
the data reveals that the pattern of bequest distribution is similar to the one mentioned for US; 
about 90% of European parents divide their states equally among children (see table 1)
2. Apart 
from the above mentioned explanations of equal sharing of bequests, note also t hat in Europe the 
freedom to depart from equal division of bequests is limited by inheritance laws. The costly process 
of writing a will is the way to distribute the state  unequally among children, although within the 
limits of the inheritance laws. 29% of the deceased with at least two children left a will, but only 
16% of them decided to divide their states unequally. 
 
                                                       
2 In the waves 2 and 3 of SHARE there is an end of life questionnaire to gather information about a deceased respondent. 
The relatives (mainly children and spouse) of the deceased are asked if the state was divided equally or about equally 
among the children.    4 
Table 1. State divided among children (%) 
 
Country  Unequally  Equally  N 
Austria            23.1                76.9   26 
Germany            20.6                79.4   34 
Sweden              3.1                96.9   65 
Netherlands              8.0                92.0   50 
Spain              7.0                93.0   86 
Italy              6.7                93.3   60 
France              5.4                94.6   56 
Denmark              7.7                92.3   65 
Greece            10.3                89.7   87 
Switzerland              6.7                93.3   15 
Belgium              2.1                97.9   48 
Czech Rep.              6.7                93.3   30 
Poland            36.6                63.4   41 
Total              9.8                90.2   663 
Calculated for deceased people between 2004 and 2009, with at least two 
children. Source: SHARE-R.2.3.1, SHARELIFE-R.1. Own calculations. 
 
  Contrary to the bequests results, the patterns found in the division of inter-vivos transfers for 
European parents are striking (see table 2). There is a remarkably high prevalence of parents giving 
equal inter-vivos transfers, being about 35%. This percentage is much higher than the ones found 
with US data. As we have mentioned, equal division of inter-vivos transfers is hardly explained by 
the  standard  approaches  in  the  literature.  Indeed,  the  main  efforts  of  the  recent  literature  on 
transfers are directed to solve the puzzle of having a very large share of equal bequests and a very 
low  share  of  equal  inter-vivos  transfers.  However,  such  puzzle  is  less  evident  for  European 
countries as the data on inter-vivos transfers reveals. 
Table 2. % of parents giving equal transfers to children* 
 
 Country  2004/05  2006/07  Both waves 
 
%  N  %  N  %  N 
Austria   28.4   141   36.4   129   32.2   270 
Germany   25.3   217   26.0   235   25.7   452 
Sweden   44.2   403   47.0   389   45.6   792 
Netherlands   35.7   235   35.7   210   35.7   445 
Spain   11.1   27   15.0   20   12.8   47 
Italy   26.3   80   42.5   134   36.4   214 
France   32.9   173   32.8   186   32.9   359 
Denmark   42.5   174   45.5   308   44.4   482 
Greece   14.0   157   17.4   121   15.5   278 
Switzerland   28.0   75   30.9   110   29.7   185 
Belgium   39.2   171   46.9   160   42.9   331 
Czech Rep.       40.3   159   40.3   159 
Poland       19.4   108   19.4   108 
Ireland 
   
           7.7   65                 7.7   65 
Total  33.6   1,853   36.3   2,334   35.1   4,187  
*Calculated for parents with at least two children (>18 and not living in the same 
household) and conditional on the existence of at least one child receiving transfers. 
Source: SHARE-Release 2.3.1. Own calculations.   5 
  We are ready to accept the plausible assumptions that i) bequests are public information and 
inter-vivos transfers are private information, and ii) giving equal bequests can signal affection for 
children, prevent family conflict or be interpreted as the accomplishing of a social norm of equal 
division,  given  that  bequests  are  common  knowledge.  Therefore,  an  altruistic  parent  might 
distribute her inter-vivos transfers unevenly among her children given that the value of these gifts is 
kept secret. However, more than one third of European parents do not conform to this. In this paper 
we argue that parents may be regarded as equality-minded, so that they want to give equal inter-
vivos transfers  to all their children
3. Despite the facts that  the distribution of financial gift s is 
hidden to the children and that  children have different incomes, the parents want to follow the 
social norm of equal division. However, if differences in child income  grow, the altruistic parent 
may be less willing to provide equal financial gifts , so that she may start to compensate poo rer 
children with larger transfers . The roots of this reasoning are in   the model of  Bernheim and 
Severinov (2003), in which a norm of equal division can prevail even in presence of child income 
inequality, provided that the degree of this inequality is not too large. Therefore, we may generalize 
that the degree of child income inequality weakens the equal division norm. Similarly, Halvorsen 
and Thoresen (2011)   argue that parents desire to divide equally  inter-vivos  transfers  among 
children because they are adverse to inequality of transfers, which rivals with their altruism. These 
authors exploit a Norwegian dataset of inter-vivos transfers to find econometric results suggesting 
such parental dilemma. 
  The aim of this paper is to study the patterns of the division of downward inter-vivos financial 
transfers in Europe. We do not study the equal division of bequests as this has been extensively 
studied in previous studies. The results shown in table 1 are in line with the ones observed in US. 
Based on the use of the recent harmonized European dataset SHARE, we intend to contribute to the 
literature of transfers by showing and explaining the equal distribution of inter-vivos transfers. In 
this regard, the paper by Halvorsen and Thoresen (2011) is perhaps the only one studying the 
equality  of  financial  gifts,  although  this  uses  only  Norwegian  data.  For  the  US,  the  study  by 
                                                       
3  Although  not  conclusive,  the  apparently  greater  preference  of  Europeans  for  more  equality  with  respect  to  the 
Americans might give support to the different patterns of inter-vivos transfers found in Europe and US. In this regard, 
Alesina et al (2004) show appealing evidence.   6 
McGarry (1999) contains a brief section to study empirically the equality of inter-vivos transfers, 
although such results are not derived from the theoretical model presented there. As proposed here, 
McGarry (1999) finds that child income differences affect negatively the probability to make equal 
transfers. We do not study the generation and strength of a social norm of equal division; instead, 
we consider that parents are concerned with this norm at different degrees.   
  One of the major results of this paper is that we find econometric evidence showing that child 
income  inequality  affects negatively  the  probability  to  make  equal  inter-vivos  transfers. These 
results  are  robust  in  different  specifications  and  also  when  we  account  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present a theoretical discussion in 
section 2. Section 3 deals with the empirical specification and discusses the results. Finally, section 
4 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical discussion  
In  a  simple  model  of  altruism,  a  parent  cares  about  her  own  consumption  and  her  children‟s 
consumption, so that she decides about the size and the distribution of an amount T of transfers 
between her two children. To do so, the parent maximizes a utility function to find the shares 1-p 
and p of transfers T to allocate to child 1 and child 2, respectively: 
 
                                                                                      (1) 
and assume              ;                                                           (2) 
 
  The utility function is composed by the parental consumption and the consumption of each 
child valued through the parameter of parental altruism . yp and yi are the parental and child 
incomes respectively. The F.O.C. for p and T are  
               
                     and 
      
             
  
       
 
        , respectively. The optimal values are     
              
          
  and    
          
     .  An 
equal division minded parent will use p=0.5, and reach the following level of indirect utility:   7 
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  If a parent intends to give unequal transfers, she will get an indirect utility value larger than 
that of the case of equal transfers, given that the unequal transfers maximize equation 1. 
 
                 
        
                                                           (4) 
 
  However, a parent is also concerned with the norm of equal division of transfers as this is 
considered  a  way  to  be  fair  with  children
4. We can think that parents want to provide equal 
opportunities to children by giving equal inter-vivos transfers, no matter what is the relative income 
of the children. If the importance of the equal division norm is measured through a parameter 
         , the parents might follow a decision rule such that they will divide equally only if this 
action involves more utility given their taste for the equal division norm:  
 
                                                                                  (5) 
 
  If the norm of equal division does not matter ( =0) the parent will choose unequal sharing of 
transfers. The parent will give equal transfers only if equation 5 holds, which will happen for a high 
enough . A latent variable approach may help to clarify the parental dilemmas about the division 
of transfers and bring us readily to the empirical strategy. We define a latent variable    such that 
the parent gives equal transfers if       , otherwise transfers are unequal. 
 
                                                                                 (6)  
 
                                                       
4 In terms of Kolm (2006), parents may give equal transfers because they have a constraint to be fair.   8 
  The negative or positive value of the latent variable depends on parameter and variable values. 
For  example,  from  equation  6  it  is  clear  that  parents  with  a  concern  of  equal  division        
              , will divide their transfers equally; otherwise, they will divide unequally. This means 
that a higher concern with the equal division norm will increase the probability of giving equal 
transfers. The key implication of this setting is that the latent variable diminishes when the child 
income inequality increases. Given that        , an increase of child 1´s income is equivalent to a 
raise in the child income inequality. Finding a clear cut expression for               is possible but 
tedious. Nonetheless, we can highlight the effects of different values of variables and parameters on 
   by simulation. The top panel of figure 1 shows the possibility of the equal division outcome and 
the effects of the child income inequality (measured as      ) and . The darker area denotes all 
the points where equal division is chosen (i.e.       ) given the corresponding values of       and 
  (it  is  assumed    =  0.99;    =  10;   =  2).  As  is  observed,  child  income  inequality  reduces  the 
occurrence of equal sharing, while the concern with equal division increases this.  
Figure 1. Existence of equal division norm 
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  The other two panels of figure 1 show the effect of parental income on the occurrence of equal 
division. This effect is positive because the loss of parental utility due to the equal division is 
relatively less important for a wealthier parent. 
  In sum, the parent faces a trade-off. On the one hand, she wants to maximize her utility by 
giving unequal transfers, but on the other hand she is concerned to be fair by dividing the transfers 
equally. The next section presents the empirical analysis. 
   
3. Data and econometric results 
3.1 The data 
We  use  the  two  waves  of  SHARE  (released  2.3.1)  which  has  representative  and  comparable 
information  from  standardised  surveys  applied  to  people  over  50  years  old  in  Israel  and  14 
European countries: Austria, Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, 
Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland and Ireland. The last three countries were 
added in the second wave. The interviews were taken in 2004/2005 and 2006/2007 for the first and 
second wave (Ireland entered in 2008). The variables are at individual, household and couple level. 
In total, SHARE includes 31,115 and 33,281 respondents in wave 1 and 2, respectively
5. Apart 
from standard demographic variables, this dataset includes  key questions about financial transfers 
(larger than 250 Euros) between parents and children. 
  Our sample is composed by respondents with at least two children  and provided that at least 
one of them received a parental financial transfer during the 12 months previous to the interview. 
McGarry (1999) argues that zero transfers to all children do not mean a desire to treat all of them 
equally. Due to our interest in European countries, we delete observations from Israel
6. Like other 
studies, we drop respondents living with their children in the same household or aged less than 18 
years.  According to  McGarry (1999),  transfers to  non-adult children  might be due to legal 
                                                       
5 See Börsch-Supan et al (2005, 2008) and Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2005) for detailed information on the dataset and 
methodology. 
6 We do not include Ireland as this country has not yet generated key variables such as the respondent‟s household 
incomes, for example. Observations from Switzerland are also dropped because there are no data  available to impute 
labour income for respondents‟ children.    10 
obligations, and it is difficult to quantify the value of shared food and housing for co-resident 
children.  Respondents  with  missing  values  for  financial  transfers,  and  without  demographic 
information for children were also dropped. After all these selections, the sample contains 1,778 
and 2,159 respondents in wave 1 and 2. The pooled sample consists of 3,937 observations but it 
represents 3,457 respondents as some of them (=480) have answers in both waves. In the pooled 
sample,  35.8%  of  parents  give  equal  transfers.  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  in  SHARE,  some 
demographic  information  for  children  (e.g.  education,  marital  status)  is  registered  up  to  four 
children and the amount of financial and time transfers is accounted up to the third person that 
receives/gives it. This truncation is not too severe as 96.9% of the respondents of the pooled sample 
have up to four children (and 89.5% have up to three children). 
  Similarly to other datasets based on middle age interviewees, in SHARE there is no direct 
information for children‟s income. However, we can impute this variable by introducing some 
child demographics into the earnings equation estimated with another dataset. This equation is 
estimated for each country and by gender with information from the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) of year 2006
7 (see estimates in the appendix) . Other 
authors also impute earnings to solve the lack of information either for children or for parents. For 
example, Cox (1987) and Cox and Jakubson (1995) assume that children and parents live near each 
other, so that they use the average income of the metro politan areas where children live to 
approximate the parental income. Cox and Rank (1992) use earnings functions estimated with the 
same dataset that contains child information to impute parental income at the standardized age of 
45. McGarry (1999) uses th e mid points of child income intervals  -answered by the parents- to 
impute child income. Although it would be desirable to correct the earnings equations for sample 
selection,  there  is  not  enough  demographic  information  in  SHARE  for  respondents‟  children. 
However, as suggested by Harmon et al (2003) in their analysis on the returns to education in 
European countries, some sample bias could in general exist but this appears not to be large.   
                                                       
7 The EU-SILC contains comparable cross-sectional and longitudinal multidimensional microdata on income, poverty, 
social exclusion and living conditions in Europe. We construct the log of hourly labour income by using the gross yearly 
wage of employees in full-time jobs (aged 18-65). Due to availability, in Greece and Italy we use the monthly wage. This 
variable is regressed against variables measured in SHARE as well, i.e. age and its square, marital status and education 
level.   11 
  We focus our attention on monetary transfers from parents to non co-resident adult children
8. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used  are reported in table 3. The transfers are important 
for the children who receive them. The mean of the ratio of transfers received over child income is 
0.141 for all respondents‟ children of our sample. Furthermore, all the transfers sent to children 
represent 12.4% of the parent‟s household income. 
Table 3. Statistics for variables in pooled sample 
 
Variable        N         Mean  Std Err 
Parental characteristics 
     
 
Household income (ppp-Euro)  3,937  41,973  39,248 
 
Equal transfers          3,937             0.358         0.479  
 
Male          3,934             0.515         0.500  
 
Married or with couple          3,930             0.768         0.422  
 
Age          3,933           64.178         8.882  
 
Years of education          3,903           11.674         3.941  
 
Have long term illness          3,933             0.471         0.499  
 
Number of children          3,934             2.582         0.903  
Children characteristics (differences) 
     
 
Age          3,927             5.665         3.959  
 
Years of education          3,805             2.527         2.685  
 
Labour income (ratio)          3,729             1.480         0.482  
 
Number of children          3,932             1.200         1.215  
 
Hours of help given to parents          3,937             1.224         6.239  
 
Contact with parents, in days          3,932         108.850     117.879  
   Distance from parental home, in Km.          3,932         136.842     171.353  
 
  Similar to McGarry (1999), the variables for the children indicate the difference between the 
highest and lowest value of the relevant variable within the family. In the case of the imputed child 
income, we prefer to use the ratio between the highest and lowest values in order to make this 
variable comparable among countries
9. So,           represents a measure of income inequality 
between  children  of  the  same  family  and  this  is  the  variable  of  our  main  interest.  To  ease 
comparison among countries, and to inspect for non linearities, we use quintiles of the parent„s 
household income constructed within each country. 
                                                       
8 Parents can also receive transfers from children, but this is minimal. According to Albertini et al (2007), only 3% of 
parents from the first wave of SHARE receive transfers from children, which contrast with the 21% of parents who give 
transfers to children. 
9 Countries differ in currency, living standards and taxation systems. Furthermore, the imputed child labour income uses a 
measure of income that is harmonized in SILC -EU at great extent, but not completely. Therefore, the ratio of child 
incomes between siblings can measure better the child income inequality and be comparable among countries. It is 
expected that this inequality should not be too large for children that belong to the same family, so that taxation treatment 
should not be too different among siblings.   12 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
  We use the pooled sample to run a logit model of the probability of giving equal transfers, 
with the respondent as the unity of analysis. In terms of the latent variable    
  , the model can be 
expressed as: 
 
   
                                                                                   (7) 
        
            
      
            
      
  
   
The dependent variable takes value 1 if the parents give equal transfers to all their children, and 
zero otherwise. A parent decides to divide equally or unequally her inter-vivos transfers by taking 
in  account  the  differences  among  her  children.       contains  these  variables  and  the  parental 
demographics. As mentioned in the theoretical discussion, we expect a negative relation between 
the probability of giving equal transfers and the degree of income inequality among children. The 
last term of equation 7 is the composite error               , which is formed by the unobserved 
effect    and the idiosyncratic error    . Although the use of the differences among child variables 
is  somehow  equivalent  to  account  for  family-child  unobserved  effects  that  are  common  to  all 
children, there is still unobserved heterogeneity within the family. For this reason, and in order to 
profit from the longitudinal nature of SHARE, we will account for unobserved heterogeneity within 
the family with a random effects model. A Hausman test -that we explain further- gives support to 
this choice of model. Moreover, the random effects model allows us to show the marginal effects 
and  find  the  contribution  of  all  explanatory  variables  (both  time  constant  and  time-varying 
variables). Finally, we consider clustering for the estimation of robust standard errors as the sample 
includes few observations where the donor of transfers in one of the waves is the spouse of the 
donor of the other wave (274 over 3,697 respondents).    13 
3.3 Results 
Table 4 shows the results for the probability of making equal transfers. The first three columns 
show the results of a pooled logit model with different specifications and the last one contains the 
results when random effects are considered.  
  Concerning the parental characteristics, we observe that the number of children reduces the 
probability to give equal transfers. It is more difficult to maintain the equal division of transfers 
when there are more children  who can differ more noticeably with respect to their needs and 
incomes. There are no significant effects of the household income but belonging to the lowest 
quintiles of the household net wealth distribution diminishes the probability of equal division; so 
this relation is not linear (like in McGarry, 1999 when use HRS data). The dilemma between giving 
equal  transfers  and  behaving  more  altruistically  (dividing  unequally)  is  less  important  for  a 
wealthier parent as she can tolerate better the loss of utility associated with the equal division. 
Although education and age are proxies of permanent income, we find that years of education 
affect negatively the probability of equal division. However, note that given that income, wealth 
and  age  are  included  in  the  regressions,  the  permanent  income  attribute  of  parental  education 
becomes less important. 
  If the imputation of child labour income were not possible, we should look at the proxies of 
permanent income: age and years of education (first column). These variables are presented in the 
form of differences among siblings and affect negatively the probability of equal division. So, a 
larger difference in permanent income among children makes more difficult the decision to stick to 
the equal division of transfers, which is in line with our predictions. Column 2 shows clearly our 
main  prediction  with  the  imputed  income:  the  larger  the  inequality  of  labour  income  among 
children, the lower the probability of giving equal inter-vivos transfers. For instance, if the child 
income  ratio  doubles  (departing  from  equality               ),  the  probability  to  give  equal 
transfers declines by 6%. The variables hours of help, contact with parents and distance from 
parental  home  are  proxies  for  child  services
10.  In  the  exchange  approach,  the  parents  “buy” 
                                                       
10 Cox & Rank (1992) consider that the distance between child and parental home is a proxy for the provision of child 
services, since services are more costly to offer when the child lives further from his parent‟s home.      14 
services from children by paying accordingly with a transfer, so that children will end up receiving 
different amounts of transfers. The variables measuring differences in contact with parents and 
distance from parental home are negative and significant in all regressions. This means that at the 
moment to decide between equal and unequal transfers, parents care to some extent for differences 
in services provided by children. Like in the case of the child income inequality, parents will give 
unequal transfers if the inequality in the provision of child services becomes too large. 
  In SHARE, the respondents are also asked about the motive of the financial transfer. The 
model of the third column of table 4 adds dummy variables for each motive, which take value 1 
when at least one child received a transfer due to the corresponding motive. A child receiving a 
transfer to meet basic needs can be considered as an act of altruism, so that the equal division of 
transfers should be less probable. And this is what we observe in our results. Helping at least one 
child to buy a house or with a large expenditure also reduces the probability of equal transfers. In 
these cases, the equal division is less likely because the parent is unable to donate the same high 
amount  of  money  to  all  her  children.  Helping  a  child  when  facing  a  shock  (sudden  illness, 
unemployment and divorce) reduces the probability of equal transfers as well. The probability of 
equal transfers also diminishes when at least one child receives a transfer to fund further education. 
Each child has different needs with respect to their educational formation, so that the timing and 
cost of this  acquisition  can  differ  a  great  deal  among  siblings.  Thus, equal transfers  aimed  at 
funding further education should be unequal. Contrary to the previous effects, the probability of 
giving equal transfers increases when there are no specific reasons to transfer. This case is close to 
a situation of a “pure” financial gift with no attached strings. In such a case, the equal division 
norm prevails. 
  The model in the last column of table 4 controls for unobserved heterogeneity with random 
effects. A Hausman test between fixed and random effects (p-value = 0.783) does not allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the unobserved effect and the covariates, so 
that we can use a random effects specification. There are not many differences between this model 
and the pooled logit. Our main variable of interest –child income inequality- still affects negatively 
the probability of equal transfers and significantly (p-value = 0.022), although the marginal effect   15 
becomes slightly larger. Furthermore, the effect of the difference in the number of grandchildren is 
negative and significant. If one child has a bigger family, then that child has more expenses to cope 
with,  so that  she could  receive  larger  transfers  from  the  respondent.  And  this  will  reduce  the 
willingness of the parents to give equal transfers. 
Table 4. Logit marginal effects of the probability of equal inter-vivos transfers 
 
   
(1) 
   
(2) 




Variable  dF/dx  S. E.     dF/dx  S.E.     dF/dx  S.E.     dF/dx  S.E.    
Parental characteristics 
                       
 
Male  0.0118  0.017 
 
0.0120  0.018 
 
0.0113  0.018 
 
0.0120  0.022 
 
 
Married  0.0308  0.022 
 
0.0326  0.023 
 
0.0316  0.023 
 
0.0430  0.028 
 
 
Age  0.0045  0.001 ***  0.0038  0.001 ***  0.0017  0.001 
 
0.0025  0.001 * 
 
Years of education  -0.0108  0.003 ***  -0.0102  0.003 ***  -0.0074  0.003 ***  -0.0087  0.003 *** 
 
Long term illness  -0.0041  0.017 
 
-0.0046  0.017 
 
0.0001  0.017 
 
-0.0041  0.022 
 
 
Number of children  -0.0544  0.014 ***  -0.0709  0.013 ***  -0.0660  0.013 ***  -0.0835  0.016 *** 
 
Income quintiles 
                       
 
   1st - lowest  -0.0110  0.032 
 
-0.0097  0.032 
 
-0.0173  0.033 
 
-0.0061  0.041 
 
 
   2nd  0.0082  0.030 
 
0.0082  0.030 
 
0.0015  0.030 
 
0.0150  0.038 
 
 
   3rd   0.0095  0.026 
 
0.0112  0.026 
 
0.0066  0.026 
 
0.0206  0.033 
 
 
   4th  0.0022  0.024 
 
0.0001  0.024 
 
-0.0063  0.024 
 
0.0032  0.030 
 
 
Net wealth quintiles 
                       
 
   1st - lowest  -0.0717  0.029 **  -0.0752  0.029 ***  -0.0577  0.030 *  -0.0800  0.034 ** 
 
   2nd  -0.0631  0.025 **  -0.0662  0.025 ***  -0.0535  0.026 **  -0.0743  0.030 ** 
 
   3rd   0.0025  0.025 
 
-0.0020  0.025 
 
0.0057  0.026 
 
0.0000  0.032 
 
 
   4th  0.0094  0.023 
 
0.0082  0.023 
 
0.0078  0.024 
 
0.0027  0.029 
  Children characteristics (diff.) 
                       
 
Age  -0.0087  0.003 *** 
                 
 
Years of education  -0.0091  0.003 *** 
                 
 
Labour Income (ratio) 
     
-0.0601  0.020 ***  -0.0466  0.021 **  -0.0614  0.027 ** 
 
Number of children  -0.0093  0.008 
 
-0.0113  0.009 
 
-0.0174  0.010 *  -0.0202  0.010 ** 
 
Hours of help given to parents  -0.0010  0.001 
 
-0.0011  0.001 
 
-0.0014  0.001 
 
-0.0011  0.002 
 
 
Contact with parents  -0.0004  0.0001 ***  -0.0004  0.0001 ***  -0.0004  0.0001 ***  -0.0005  0.0001 *** 
 
Distance from parental home  -0.0003  0.0001 ***  -0.0003  0.0001 ***  -0.0003  0.0001 ***  -0.0004  0.0001 *** 
Motives to make transfers 
                       
 
To meet basic needs 
           
-0.1374  0.022 ***  -0.1562  0.024 *** 
 
Buy/furnish a house 
           
-0.0489  0.024 **  -0.0546  0.027 ** 
 
Help with a large expenditure 
           
-0.0740  0.024 ***  -0.0942  0.026 *** 
 
For a major event 
           
0.0204  0.028 
 
0.0329  0.035 
 
 
To help coping a shock 
           
-0.2346  0.024 ***  -0.2300  0.019 *** 
 
For further education 
           
-0.0994  0.032 ***  -0.1062  0.032 *** 
 
To meet legal obligations 
           
-0.1138  0.079 
 
-0.1411  0.065 ** 
 
No specific reasons 
           
0.1609  0.025 ***  0.2155  0.034 *** 
                            Number of observations  3762 
   
3697 
   
3697 
   
3697 
    Pooled logit regressions include dummies for countries and wave. Random effects include country dummies. 
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
 
  In SHARE there is a proxy to parental altruism only measured in the sample of persons who 
completed the self-administered questionnaire of the survey. These persons are asked how much 
they agree with the following statement: “parents‟ duty is to do their best for their children even at 
the expense of their own well-being”. The responses range from 1=strongly agree to 5=strongly 
disagree. In figure 2, the share of parents who give equal transfers is depicted against the average   16 
of the altruism proxy in each country
11. Higher values of this proxy indicate a  larger degree of 
altruism.  Although  far from  conclusive,  figure 2  suggests  the existence of a negative relation 
between altruism and equal division.  Note that different countries with similar share of equal 
division have different degrees of altruism.   However, this  proxy  is  not  significant  when  it  is 
included (linearly or non-linearly) in the regressions. In addition, as this proxy is answered by a 
considerably  fewer  number  of  persons,  the  sample  is  severely  reduced  when  that  variable  is 
included in the regressions. 
Figure 2. Equal transfers and degree of altruism 
 
    
  Furthermore, our results can be compared to those that use American data. For instance, the 
coefficient of variation of the parental income in our sample is rather similar to that of McGarry 
(1999) and McGarry & Schoeni (1995) who use the HRS and AHEAD datasets. Although it would 
be ideal to measure the percentage that the transfers represent with respect to the child‟s income in 
the studies made with European and American data, there is only available and comparable data for 
parental income. We find that the ratio of transfers over the parental income is similar. Thus, 
differences between European and American parents with respect to their transfer behaviour do not 
necessarily rely on sample design differences or on sharp income variability
12.   
                                                       
11 For the figure, the original responses are simply rescaled as (1; 2; 3; 4; 5) = (1; 0.75; 0.50; 0.25; 0). 
12 The coefficient of variation for the parental income in our sample is 0.94, whilst it is 0.85 and 0.90 in McGarry (1999) 
for the HRS and AHEAD datasets, respectively. And it is  1.09 in McGarry & Schoeni (1995). The proportion of the 
average transfer over the average parental income of the population analysed is 0.07 in our sample and in McGarry & 

















































Less altruist                                                                  More altruist  17 
  As mentioned, the incidence of equal transfers decreases with the number of children which is 
also present in the results with US data. Table 5 compares our results with the ones of Hochguertel 
and H. Ohlsson (2009) who use the HRS dataset. 
Table 5. % of parents giving equal inter-vivos transfers 
 
N.  of children  Our sample  US* 
2  41.5  18.0 
3  29.4  8.2 
4  23.8  5.4 
          +4  18.2  2.8 
        Total  35.8  9.2 
 * Hochguertel & Ohlsson (2009), HRS waves 1992-2002 
   
  In US, the percentage of equal transfers also decreases with the number of children but its 
level is much lower than in Europe. Although in SHARE the financial transfers are recorded up to 
the third receiver and some demographics are obtainable up to  four children, we still observe a 
remarkable  difference  between  the  European  and  American  parents  who  have  two  and  three 
children. In order to asses the specification of our model, we can run the last regression of table 4 
only in the sample of parents who have up to four and three children. The results are not very 
different, and our variable of interest -income inequality- remains significant and negative. With 
the sample restricted to parents with a maximum of 4 and 3 children, the marginal effects decrease 
slightly to -0.0587 (p-value = 0.042), and -0.0529 (p-value = 0.097), respectively. 
  Although the analysis of bequests is not part of the scope of this paper, it is interesting to 
present  some  descriptive  information  about  how  parents  distribute  bequests  and  inter-vivos 
transfers in comparison to other studies. For example, in Light & McGarry (2004) only 15.8% of 
the mothers surveyed in their study intend to divide both bequests and transfers equally. Although 
our sample is small (n=64) -because few respondents of SHARE with information on financial 
transfers have deceased- we can highlight a different behaviour in Europe. In our sample, there is 
more consistency in the behaviour of parents with respect to the division of states and transfers. In 
table 6, one can observe that 31.3% of European parents divide bequests and transfers equally. As 
mentioned in the introduction section, American and European show a remarkably different pattern 
to distribute bequests and inter-vivos transfers. 
   18 
Table 6. Division of inter-vivos transfers and bequests 
 
   
Light & McGarry (2004): 
 
Our sample: 




   
unequal  equal  n 
 
unequal  equal  n 
Bequests  unequal       5.3%     1.9% 
   
    9.4%    3.1% 
 
 
equal     77.1%   15.8%  855 
 
  56.3%  31.3%  64 
   
  Finally, a complementary way to analyse the equal division of transfers is to inspect how far 
the parents are willing to depart from the equal division norm. For this purpose, we create a new 
dependent variable that measures the degree to which the parents deviate from the equal division 
norm. For each respondent, we divide the largest transfer given to one of the children over the sum 
of all transfers and subtract the proportion of the transfers that each child should receive under the 
norm of equal division. For a family j with    children, the expression of the dependent variable is  
                         . This variable is positive when the division of transfers is unequal and zero 
when it is equal. Larger values will indicate that the departure from the equal division norm is more 
intense. As this variable contains a focal point at the value of zero (for equal transfers), it is 
appropriate to use a corner solution model. Table 7 shows the results of a Tobit model when we 
regress the intensity of unequal division against the same set of variables considered in the previous 
regressions. The results are comparable to the ones of table 4. Child income inequality affects 
positively the intensity of unequal division, which is in line with the negative logit estimate for the 
probability of equal division. Indeed, that variable is the one that contributes more to the level of 
the intensity of unequal division with a coefficient of 0.073, which is one fourth of the mean of the 
dependent variable (=0.288). As before, two of the proxies for child services contact and distance 
from parental home are significant. Their coefficients are positive which also accords  with the 
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Table 7. Tobit estimates of the intensity of unequal division 
 
Variable       Pooled Tobit 
 
Random effects Tobit 
Parental characteristics  Coeff.    Std Err        Coeff.  Std Err    
 
Male  -0.0001  0.0133 
   
0.0000  0.0132 
 
 
Married  -0.0298  0.0170  * 
 
-0.0305  0.0173  * 
 
Age  0.0001  0.0008 
   
0.00001  0.0008 
 
 
Years of education  0.0030  0.0019 
   
0.0031  0.0019 
 
 
Long term illness  -0.0003  0.0129 
   




             
 
   1st - lowest  0.0249  0.0236 
   
0.0240  0.0237 
 
 
   2nd  0.0149  0.0220 
   
0.0132  0.0217 
 
 
   3rd   0.0112  0.0192 
   
0.0110  0.0188 
 
 
   4th  0.0085  0.0177 
   
0.0064  0.0176 
 
 
Net wealth Quintiles 
             
 
   1st - lowest  0.0618  0.0222  *** 
 
0.0618  0.0227  *** 
 
   2nd  0.0369  0.0202  * 
 
0.0409  0.0200  ** 
 
   3rd   0.0013  0.0191 
   
0.0011  0.0189 
 
 
   4th  0.0084  0.0182 
   
0.0106  0.0173 
  Children characteristics (differences) 
             
 
Labour Income (ratio)  0.0723  0.0127  *** 
 
0.0729  0.0135  *** 
 
Number of children  0.0297  0.0071  *** 
 
0.0298  0.0056  *** 
 
Hours of help given to parents  -0.0001  0.0009 
   
-0.0003  0.0009 
 
 
Contact with parents, hours  0.0004  0.0001  *** 
 
0.0004  0.0001  *** 
 
Distance from parental home, km.  0.0002  0.00004  *** 
 
0.0003  0.00004  *** 
Constant  0.0999  0.0778 
   
0.1024  0.0789 
 
                Number of observations  3,697  
     
3,697  
    R2  0.151 
            Log likelihood  -1,965.2           -1,933.0       
Regressions include dummies for countries, motives to make transfers and wave. 
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
   
4. Conclusion 
We find in the newly harmonized dataset SHARE that the equal division puzzle is less evident in 
Europe as there is a high prevalence of parents giving equal inter-vivos transfers to their adult 
children. Approximately 90% and 35% of parents distribute their states and inter-vivos transfers 
equally, respectively. In US the share of equal division of states is similar but the share of equal 
division of inter-vivos transfers is remarkably lower, about 7% depending on the study. In this 
paper  we  argue  that  altruistic  parents  are  also  concerned  with  norms  of  equal  division.  Thus, 
parents do not fully offset child income inequality as the altruistic model of transfers predicts. We 
consider that parents start to give larger transfers to poorer children if the child income inequality 
becomes unbearable. To sustain this idea, we find econometric evidence about the negative effect 
of child income inequality on the probability of giving equal transfers under different specifications 
and accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. 
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Appendix 
 
Estimates of the log of hourly labour income (employees 18-65 in full-time jobs) 
Variables  Austria  Belgium  Cz. R.  Germany  Denmark  Spain  France  Greece  Italy  Nether.  Poland  Sweden 
Women 
                       
Age  0.0742  0.0586  0.0343  0.1367  0.1135  0.0502  0.0555  0.0549  0.0354  0.1226  0.0974  0.1648 
 
0.0122  0.0135  0.0089  0.0087  0.0079  0.0107  0.0092  0.0089  0.0037  0.0153  0.0087  0.0127 
Age sq.  -0.0007  -0.0005  -0.0003  -0.0014  -0.0011  -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0013  -0.0009  -0.0016 
 
0.0002  0.0002  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0002  0.0001  0.0001 
Married  -0.0134  0.0699  0.0051  0.0408  0.0237  0.0820  -0.0089  0.0914  0.0637  0.1151  0.0414  0.1069 
 
0.0376  0.0275  0.0247  0.0237  0.0253  0.0274  0.0235  0.0252  0.0109  0.0365  0.0220  0.0432 
Low sec.  0.0387  0.1533  0.3367  0.4726  0.4647  0.1775  0.2234  0.1291  0.1342  0.0322  0.4631  0.0109 
 
0.1703  0.0800  0.0373  0.2388  0.2346  0.0518  0.0592  0.0469  0.0276  0.1283  0.2126  0.0920 
Upper sec.  0.4825  0.2781  0.6566  0.9150  0.6622  0.4382  0.3908  0.3730  0.3894  0.3131  0.3496  0.0885 
 
0.1663  0.0690  0.0176  0.2338  0.2338  0.0482  0.0533  0.0354  0.0263  0.1152  0.0382  0.0684 
Tertiary  0.8638  0.5391  1.1681  1.1427  0.8581  0.8480  0.7313  0.7798  0.6725  0.6055  1.1044  0.2464 
 
0.1690  0.0655  0.0299  0.2340  0.2339  0.0450  0.0539  0.0363  0.0284  0.1117  0.0401  0.0685 
Constant  0.1383  0.6838  -0.6993  -1.6326  -0.5795  -0.0242  0.3110  -0.0855  0.8273  -0.5128  -2.1601  -1.8686 
 
0.2747  0.2803  0.1805  0.2875  0.2862  0.2237  0.1851  0.1766  0.0730  0.3174  0.1689  0.2688 
n  1439  1090  2040  2427  2256  1815  2834  1259  5062  938  4633  2263 
R2  0.222  0.231  0.065  0.423  0.319  0.358  0.179  0.432  0.349  0.300  0.344  0.237 
Men 
                       
Age  0.0716  0.0607  0.0603  0.1315  0.1077  0.0527  0.0791  0.0579  0.0378  0.1240  0.0774  0.1483 
 
0.0081  0.0091  0.0075  0.0062  0.0072  0.0073  0.0068  0.0064  0.0029  0.0069  0.0074  0.0116 
Age sq.  -0.0007  -0.0005  -0.0007  -0.0013  -0.0011  -0.0004  -0.0007  -0.0005  -0.0003  -0.0012  -0.0008  -0.0015 
 
0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
Married  0.0991  0.0844  0.1204  0.1414  0.2175  0.1299  0.1252  0.1063  0.0861  0.2105  0.2616  0.2374 
 
0.0280  0.0226  0.0225  0.0228  0.0341  0.0254  0.0226  0.0213  0.0093  0.0238  0.0259  0.0429 
Low sec.  0.4888  0.1639  0.6448  0.3564  0.2520  0.1193  0.1291  0.0797  0.1238  0.0518  -0.3614  -0.0995 
 
0.5199  0.0451  0.0409  0.1640  0.2102  0.0282  0.0343  0.0296  0.0167  0.0319  0.2572  0.0613 
Upper sec.  0.8512  0.3038  0.9083  0.7853  0.4274  0.3458  0.2231  0.1891  0.2810  0.2140  0.3336  0.0569 
 
0.5190  0.0395  0.0146  0.1597  0.2089  0.0269  0.0271  0.0226  0.0167  0.0293  0.0348  0.0507 
Tertiary  1.1310  0.5056  1.3558  1.1099  0.6203  0.6236  0.5401  0.5304  0.5937  0.5652  0.9907  0.2465 
 
0.5193  0.0401  0.0271  0.1598  0.2093  0.0262  0.0293  0.0262  0.0214  0.0303  0.0392  0.0527 
Constant  -0.0609  0.7719  -1.1246  -1.4321  -0.0859  0.3155  0.1202  0.2116  0.9999  -0.5131  -1.5499  -1.1656 
 
0.5424  0.1912  0.1562  0.1964  0.2577  0.1462  0.1357  0.1224  0.0555  0.1436  0.1433  0.2450 
n  2796  2015  2556  5077  3008  3006  4248  1971  7991  4270  5670  2980 
R2  0.240  0.277  0.197  0.475  0.323  0.317  0.256  0.383  0.303  0.428  0.250  0.241 
Primary education is the reference for the education dummies. Standard errors in italics. 
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